US government snitch-finder pleads guilty to leaking state secrets to foreign spies

The former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) IT specialist previously accused of trying to pass secret and top-secret information to foreign spies has pleaded guilty following a successful FBI sting.

Nathan Vilas Laatsch, then 28, and now 29, was arrested in May 2025 after an undercover FBI agent caught him for the second time transmitting intelligence packages in a public park that he believed would be collected by a foreign government’s spy.

The man, who had been employed at the DIA as a civilian employee since 2019, held top-secret clearance, and in March 2025 offered to transmit classified information to an overseas administration.

The identity of this country has never been revealed, but court documents [PDF] describe it as “a friendly foreign government.” Laatsch was assigned to the DIA’s Insider Threat Division in “spring 2025,” a unit dedicated to identifying government workers who were likely to leak, or already were leaking, classified information to foreign powers.

According to the Justice Department, the FBI “became aware” of Laatsch’s offer in March.

The man’s initial email, sent from a newly created account, had the subject line: “Outreach from USA Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Officer.” The email introduced Laatsch, his role at the DIA, and the service he was willing to provide.

According to the complaint, Laatsch served in a technical role in support of the DIA's internal Officer of Security (SEC).

Among other things, his duties included "enabling user activity monitoring on individuals with access to DIA systems, including individuals who are under investigation" and "assisting external partners, such as law enforcement, on the use of insider threat tools." “I am willing to share classified information that I have access to, which are completed intelligence products, some unprocessed intelligence, and other assorted classified documentation,” the email stated.

The email included a picture of his government ID used to enter and exit his Washington, D.C. workplace, with name and image redacted, and a username associated with an encrypted messaging platform the recipient could use to continue the conversation.

Soon after Laatsch’s email was intercepted, the FBI instigated an undercover operation to trick the IT bod into thinking that he was talking to a genuine spy.

The feds’ efforts were not immediately successful.

Agents replied on March 23, saying: “Good afternoon, I received your message and share your concerns.

We are glad you reached out.

I look forward to your response and learning more about your work.” Laatsch did not respond until April 14, after the FBI sent a follow-up via the original email address on April 4.