How AI makes biological research more dangerous

This week's dire warnings about unchecked artificial intelligence destroying humanity are refocusing attention on how models already are being used in dangerous bioscience experiments — and the lack of safeguards.

Why it matters: There's growing alarm about emerging risks from advances like AI-designed viruses.

But it's hard to erect guardrails when there's no ironclad way of even knowing how some AI systems will act.

AI-enabled bioweapons are one of the worst-case scenarios researchers have raised for the kind of catastrophic danger that could wipe out humanity.

Driving the news: On Thursday, Anthropic disclosed that it disrupted five potential instances of actors using its models in ways that could support the development of biological weapons.

The disclosure came in a threat assessment detailing real-world case studies it uncovered and disrupted between December and August.

In two of the cases, researchers were attempting to use Claude for assistance with gain-of-function research on dangerous viruses — research that enhances pathogens in a lab to better understand them and their potential for starting pandemics.

The assessment notes that biological capabilities can be used for beneficial or harmful purposes, and that it's difficult to determine intent, especially when sophisticated actors can hide their motives.

"We take these cases as evidence not of the imminence of biological threats currently uplifted by Claude, but rather as evidence that significant dual-use research efforts are associated with state actors of concern who routinely evade our access controls," the report concludes.

"Safeguarding access to such content will necessarily require account and institutional signals to verify user legitimacy, and the rudimentary observability provided by data retention to identify misuse." Anthropic's most recent models have been launched with safeguards that restrict access to biological research queries that could be misused.

The big picture: The assessment comes as AI is rapidly reshaping the life sciences and testing the patchwork of laws and government agencies that oversee high-risk research.

Last month, a Stanford research team reported that it used a different kind of generative AI to design a synthetic virus — the first time the technology was harnessed to create an organism not seen in nature.

A survey of more than 100 national security experts by the Institute for Security and Technology this month found 70% believe AI meaningfully increases the risk of developing a bioweapon, or will within two to three years.

The experts said AI's chief threat is lowering the barrier to entry for less-skilled actors and states.