Who is watching us? The hidden risks in global technology competition

As the US and China vie for technological superiority, Daryl Swanepoel of the Inclusive Society says the implications for global surveillance and data privacy grow ever more complex.

The debate over Chinese technology is framed almost entirely around one question: can Beijing use Chinese-built telecommunications networks, cloud systems, artificial-intelligence platforms or drones to conduct surveillance? The answer is yes. It is technically possible. But stopping there produces a dangerously incomplete picture, because precisely the same question must be asked of the United States.

Modern digital technology is not politically neutral infrastructure. Telecommunications equipment processes traffic and metadata. Cloud providers store information and control access to computing capacity. Drone platforms collect imagery, coordinates and flight histories. AI companies process prompts, documents and organisational data. Manufacturers can alter the behaviour of these systems through software and firmware updates.

Any state able to compel, compromise or cooperate with the companies controlling these technologies may potentially gain access to valuable information. That is true whether the supplier is Chinese, American, or from any other country.

Western security concerns about China are not imaginary. Article 7 of China's National Intelligence Law requires organisations and citizens to support, assist and cooperate with national intelligence work. Chinese state-sponsored cyber operations against telecommunications and critical infrastructure have also been documented. A 2025 joint advisory issued by the United States and international partners described Chinese-linked actors compromising networks around the world to support an espionage system.

The technical risks are equally credible. Telecommunications equipment contains remotely maintained software, while internet-connected drones can transfer imagery, location information and telemetry. Joint guidance from the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation warns that Chinese-manufactured unmanned aircraft systems can create pathways for data to leave an organisation, and that manufacturer-controlled updates could introduce previously unknown collection functions.

These are legitimate reasons for scrutiny. They are not, however, evidence that every Chinese product contains a hidden backdoor, or that all data passing through Chinese equipment is automatically delivered to Beijing. British authorities examining Huawei equipment repeatedly identified serious weaknesses in software engineering and security assurance.

However, the official 2019 Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre Oversight Board report stated that the identified defects were not believed to be the result of Chinese state interference.